in article 4(4).
3 This is arguably the most critical undertaking in the Agreement for industrialized states such as the United States, codifying the expectation that developed countries will 'continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets'.
To the casual observer, this episode might have seemed just an inconsequential quibble with little broader significance. Correctly understood, it is anything but. US Secretary of State John Kerry proclaimed as much, vigorously asserting that, absent this change, the United States would refuse to become party to the instrument. 4 The clash over article 4(4) had been prefigured prior to the opening of COP 21, when President François Hollande had initiated a debate with Secretary Kerry over the legal form of the Paris Outcome, and in particular whether it would be a 'treaty'. 5 These two exchanges, which bookended the conference proper, are both emblematic of the challenges encountered by the [page 154] United States not just in the UN-sponsored climate negotiations, but also in many other areas of US foreign policy, particularly those involving implementation through domestic regulatory initiatives.
Although the United States' reengagement with the multilateral climate negotiations and its negotiating strategy have been much praised for shielding the outcome from domestic political and legal attack, 6 the apparent preference for non-binding over binding formats comes at a potentially high price in the form of the durability of the US expressions of intent on the international level. Using the exchanges over the word 'treaty' and the US last-minute insistence on 'should' over 'shall' as examples, this article first reviews the history of the UN-sponsored climate negotiations, with an emphasis on the participation of the United States. Then domestic implementation of international climate-related commitments is examined, an analysis that includes the roles of the Executive Branch, the Senate, the full Congress, and the courts.
Following that, the piece scrutinizes the crucial legal doctrine concerning the 'executive agreement,' an instrument of potentially great utility as a vehicle for the United States to make internationally legally binding economy-wide emission-reduction commitments without the participation of the Congress or the Senate. In performing this assessment, 3 Compare UN Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (12 December 2015) (President's final draft of Paris Agreement and accompanying decision as initially presented), <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf> with U.N. Doc. No. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (12 December 2015) (final as adopted), <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf>. 4 Eddy, supra note 2 (quoting Kerry as saying 'I said: "We cannot do this and we will not do this. And either it changes, or President Obama and the United States will not be able to support this agreement."'). 5 E.g., Michael Stothard and Demetri Sevastopulo, 'Hollande Rejects Kerry's Comments on Paris Climate Accord', Financial Times, 12 November 2015, <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5ab680d4-8965-11e5-9f8c-a8d619fa707c.html#axzz3yAP8WwU2>; Demetri Sevastopulo and Pillita Clark, 'Paris Climate Deal will not be a Legally Binding Treaty', Financial Times, 11 November 2015 (quoting Kerry as saying 'December's climate change talks will not deliver a "treaty" that legally requires countries to cut their carbon emissions'), <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79daf872-8894-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896.html#axzz3yAP8WwU2>. 6 E.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, 'How US Negotiators Ensured Landmark Paris Climate Deal was Republican-Proof', The Guardian, 13 December 2015, <www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/dec/13/climate-change-paris-deal-cop21-obama-administration-congress-republicansenvironment>.
the article seeks to elucidate the unseen dynamics behind not only the Paris negotiations, but any number of other multilateral efforts. As a consequence of this assessment, guidance emerges in distinguishing negotiating positions of the Executive Branch that are legally necessary from those that are policy-driven.
The International Legal Architecture
There is no question about the Paris Agreement's legal force under international law. After entry into force, the Agreement will be a legally binding treaty within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
7 The Agreement's provisions on signature, ratification, and entry into force 8 remove any doubt about the intent of the parties to the Agreement to be bound under, and [page 155] hence governed by, international law. Viewed within the regime established by the Framework Convention, however, the legal form of the Paris Agreement displays a number of curious attributes.
The Copenhagen Negotiations and the Durban Platform
The possibilities for a 'legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties,' mandated by COP 17 9 and subsequently described by the neutral term 'Paris Outcome' during the negotiations leading to COP 21, are quite clearly identified in the text of the Convention. The most obvious is a new protocol, which would be applicable to all Convention parties including the United States. An additional amendment to the Kyoto Protocol beyond the Doha Amendment 10 might technically meet this test, but would be fraught with procedural and political difficulties, especially given the United States' rejection of Kyoto. The identification of a third commitment period under Kyoto would likely have encountered similar analytical and political difficulties. Another option for a legally binding instrument applicable to all parties could conceivably have been an amendment to the Convention itself, expressly anticipated by article 15.
The United States signalled its discomfort with these choices, by electing the answer, in effect, 'none of the above.' The form of next multilateral climate agreement, as indicated in part by the name of the instrument, was discussed as far back as the year before COP 15 in Copenhagen, which laid the foundation for the broad contours of the Paris Outcome. Since then governments had widely understood that the next agreement could not be called a 'protocol' without complicating US participation. 11 The US submission to the pre-Copenhagen process uses the unexpected (from the perspective of the Convention and the Protocol) term 'implementing agreement'. 12 The US submission prior to COP 20 in Lima in 2014 referred specifically to the 'Paris Agreement'.
[page 156]

The Paris Negotiations
Early on in the implementation of the 'bottom-up' approach based on individual national submissions of INDCs leading to the Paris Agreement, the United States made clear its expectation that the Paris Outcome would be a mixture of both legally binding commitments and non-binding political statements of intent not governed by international law. It also elaborated with considerable specificity the dividing line between the two. 3 (modifying multilateral convention through procedure other than specified in parent agreement). In the end, there was no binding instrument adopted at COP 15, so the issue of its legal form and relationship to the Convention's structure did not arise at the multilateral level. 13 The name of the resulting instrument, the Paris Agreement, is consistent with the 'none of the above' options seemingly preferred by the United States as to legal form. The Agreement and its accompanying decision refer repeatedly to the Convention, as in establishing that the Convention COP will serve as the meeting of the parties under the agreement, 19 that the Convention's Secretariat will service both agreements, 20 and that the Convention's amendment procedures apply to the Paris Agreement as well. 21 Nonetheless, because the text of the Convention does not anticipate a freestanding agreement connected in a legal manner to the parent instrument, the Paris Agreement's relationship to the Convention, unlike the Kyoto Protocol's and Doha Amendment's, is not entirely clear. More problematically, although the non-binding decision in which the Paris Agreement is embedded makes passing reference to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement proper makes not a single reference to that instrument. This is not just a curious attribute, but a potentially serious omission that could raise legal questions about continuity of the climate regime from the Protocol to the new Agreement.
Domestic Legal Constraints and Opportunities in the Exercise of Executive Power
Consistent with the British doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament from which the American legal system is derived, the United States is primarily a dualist system. The international and domestic legal orders do not intersect except through the operation of 18 Submission by Norway to the ADP (2015), <http://perma.cc/Y8KC-WTZG>. 19 Paris Agreement, supra note 8, art. 16(1). 20 Ibid., art. 17(1). 21 Ibid., art 22. some mechanism linking the two. Binding international agreements, whose parties are states, operate as the legal equivalent of a contract or compact in international law, thereby making law for the states parties to them. Treaties, subordinate to the Constitution, have binding effect on the domestic level as well, typically with the legal force of a statute.
22
[page 158] On domestic matters, the US Congress adopts binding, prospective legislation, implemented by the President as Chief Executive, who has a constitutionally based duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed'. 23 In the area of foreign relations, by contrast, the text and structure of the US Constitution embody a tension between the President's power effectively to represent the United States as a unitary state in foreign relations and the essential need to preserve the rule of law at home. Moreover, the US doctrine of separation of powers, constitutionally entrenched and rigorously enforced by the Supreme Court, can produce a situation-as at present-in which both chambers of Congress are controlled by a political party different from that to which the President is affiliated.
Treaties and Executive Agreements on Environment
The implicit assumption, dating to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, has been that either Senate advice and consent to ratification, new legislation, or both are necessary before the United States can become party to a substantive agreement under the auspices of the Framework Convention that requires reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Whether or not that was the case in 1997, or in 2001 when President Bush announced his decision not to ratify Kyoto, or for that matter at COP 15 in 2009, it is a question that is worth re-examining in light of current circumstances.
The text of the US Constitution requires the advice and consent of the Senate, by a twothirds majority, to the President's ratification of concluded international agreements. 24 But the Executive Branch also enters into a distinct and much larger category of 'executive agreements' on behalf of the United States that, unlike treaties concluded under article II, section 2 of the Constitution, do not require subsequent congressional endorsement. 25 27 the distinction is a purely domestic one peculiar to the United States and largely unknown to other legal systems.
In the case of an article II, section 2 treaty, the Senate's resolution of advice and consent to ratification provides the necessary legal authority not only for the agreement to bind the United States under international law, but also for it to operate as domestic law. With respect to an executive agreement, however, the legal authority for its domestic implementation must be found elsewhere in US domestic law. An executive agreement, like every other act of the President, must be supported by domestic legal authority. An executive agreement has come to be understood as requiring legal authority in the form of one or more of the following: (1) Congressional legislation; (2) an article II, section 2 treaty; or (3) the President's own constitutional powers.
28
In the environmental field, characterized by a complex web of legislative mandates, the most likely, although not necessarily the only, authority for an executive agreement is a statutory enactment. Although some executive agreements may be concluded based on express statutory authorizations or instruction, neither is necessary as a condition precedent to the legality of an executive agreement. Rather, the Executive may conclude an international agreement without Senate advice and consent so long as the agreement can be implemented relying on existing statutory authority. Any number of binding international agreements on environmental matters, including major multilateral conventions such as the recent Minamata Convention on Mercury 29 adopted in 2013, have been concluded as executive agreements by the United States. 30 [page 160]
Executive Agreements in the Courts
The Executive Branch's conclusion of executive agreements dates to the early years of the Republic 31 and has routinely withstood legal challenges in the courts. 32 But international agreements generally, and executive agreements in particular, also present unusual challenges to assuring Executive Branch adherence to the rule of law through judicial review. 26 US Const. art. VI. See also Whitney v. Robertson, supra note 22. 27 For the sake of precision, the remainder of this article uses the generic term 'international agreement' to identify all instruments binding on the United States under international law. The term 'treaty' is limited to those international agreements for which the Senate's advice and consent to ratification is necessary or has been given under US Constitution Article II, Section 2. 28 Channels for testing the legality of an international agreement are essential to assure that the President remains a creature of law, and that his or her authority to conclude a pact with foreign powers is not an occasion for an aggrandizement of power beyond the constraints of the domestic rule of law. Judicial review of any international agreement, whether an article II, section 2 treaty or an executive agreement concluded without Senate advice and consent, occurs only post hoc, after the agreement is already in place as a matter of international law and binding rights and obligations for the United States and the foreign treaty partners have already been created.
Even if a court were to conclude that an international agreement lacks domestic authority, that agreement would remain in force internationally, having already been concluded with foreign powers and having created international law among them to which the United States will be bound regardless of the court's holding. 33 The legal integrity and subsequent validity of an executive agreement consequently benefits from finely tuned Executive Branch determination of the existence-or absence-of legal authority before the instrument is concluded, and care to recognize those international agreements that might exceed existing legal authority.
To facilitate assurances within the Executive Branch of the existence ex ante of adequate domestic legal authority, the US State Department has adopted a [page 161] procedure known as 'Circular 175'. 34 Pursuant to that process, the negotiation and conclusion of virtually all international agreements require the prior approval of the Secretary of State or his or her designee. 35 The request for State Department approval is accompanied by a memorandum of law setting out the constitutional and statutory authority supporting the proposed agreement and identifies additional laws or regulations that may be necessary for the agreement's domestic implementation. 36 The process provides for Congressional consultation in appropriate situations. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)(plurality holding that President's termination of mutual defense treaty with Taiwan is non-justiciable political question). 35 11 US Dep't of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 724.1 ('Negotiations of treaties, or other 'significant' international agreements, or for their extension or revision, are not to be undertaken, nor any exploratory discussions undertaken with representatives of another government or international organization, until authorized in writing by the Secretary or an officer specifically authorized by the Secretary for that purpose.'). 36 Ibid., at § 724.3(h)(3). 37 See, e.g., ibid., at § § 722(4), 723.4, 725.1(5).
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, the Case-Zablocki Act, 38 the Executive is required to transmit executive agreements to Congress. The State Department is also responsible for making legal determinations as to the binding nature of international agreements, which are then collated and published. 
The Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in the Senate
The George H. W. Bush administration presented the Framework Convention to the Senate, seeking its advice and consent, which was given by division vote. 40 Neither the President's Letter of Transmittal 41 nor the Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal 42 of the Convention to the Senate mentions the domestic procedure anticipated to be followed with respect to subsequent protocols to the UNFCCC. In response to subsequent written questions from the Foreign Relations Committee, the Executive Branch stated that, if a protocol containing targets and timetables 'were negotiated and the United States [page 162] wished to become a party, we would expect such a protocol to be submitted to the Senate'. 43 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its report on the resolution of ratification for the UNFCCC, expressed the expectation that future actions that would require legally binding emission reductions would require the Senate's advice and consent. 44 This is a preference expressed by a committee of the Senate, and was not included as a formal reservation to the resolution of advice and consent adopted by the full Senate, which has wide discretion to give or withhold its consent to ratification subject to binding conditions or reservations. 45 Committee reports, while perhaps helpful in interpreting the Senate's resolution of advice and consent, do not have the force of law. 46 The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated for the United States by the Clinton Administration, and the agreement owes much of its content to US government input. But even before the Protocol's adoption, the Senate had expressed its objection to the agreement in a resolution sponsored by Senators Byrd and Hagel and adopted by a vote of 95-0, non-Annex I countries; and anticipated 'serious harm to the economy of the United States'.
The Clinton Administration consequently had relatively little expectation of obtaining Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol by the two-thirds majority required by article II, section 2 of the Constitution. Vice President Al Gore nonetheless signed the Kyoto Protocol in November 1998, toward the end of the Clinton presidency, presumably on the expectation that the composition of the Senate would shift in a direction more receptive to the agreement. In the end, the Protocol was never submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. In March 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. 48 Although the Byrd-Hagel resolution may be indicative of a generalized political sentiment in the Senate opposed to multilateral action on climate, it is [page 163] far from clear that that instrument would prevent the Executive from agreeing to binding emission reductions in the Paris Agreement. First, as a resolution of a single house of the Congress, the resolution lacks legal effect. 49 Second, a principal purpose of the Paris Agreement is to overcome the 'original sin' of the Convention and Kyoto Protocol, which assigned substantive reduction obligations only to Annex I developed countries. The Paris Agreement consequently appears to satisfy that portion of the resolution concerning the inclusion of developing countries.
Further, paragraph 2 of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, requesting 'a detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may be required to implement the protocol or other agreement' applies only to a 'protocol or other agreement which would require the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification'. The Executive Branch supplied such an analysis in its INDC. In any event, to the extent that an agreement did not require Senate advice and consent-that is, could be legally concluded as an executive agreement-this provision would not apply. That inquiry-the need for Senate advice and consent to ratification of an instrument containing internationally legally binding economy-wide emission reductions-is the subject of the remainder of this article.
Massachusetts v. EPA and subsequent Executive Branch Actions
The legal and policy setting domestically within the United States is now entirely different from the late 1990s, at the time of Kyoto when the United States had done little to cut carbon emissions, and has dramatically changed even since the Copenhagen COP.
50 From a structural point of view, the principal development has been President Obama's deployment under existing domestic authority, included but not limited to the Clean Air Act, to effectuate emission reductions in the United States.
Massachusetts v. EPA 51 was a proceeding for judicial review of a petition to the US Environmental Protection Agency, requesting the Agency to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the US Clean Air Act.
52 Consistent with President Bush's 2001 decision to [page 164] refrain from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and to decline to regulate greenhouse gases as pollutants, the EPA denied the petition in 2003. 53 Twelve states, along with several municipalities and public-interest organizations, filed suit, challenging the denial. After they lost in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 54 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court reversed by a 5-4 vote, rejecting the arguments relied on by the Court of Appeals.
The Court concluded that the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases, 55 and has a nondiscretionary duty to consider whether GHGs 'cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare'. 56 If the EPA were to make such a determination, it would then be under a mandatory duty to regulate emissions of GHGs from mobile sources-principally automobiles and trucks-under section 202 of the Act unless 'it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do'. 57 The EPA has since promulgated several important regulations requiring improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency that will substantially reduce emissions from automobiles and light-duty trucks. 58 In August 2015, the Agency adopted its Clean Power Plan, which will reduce emissions from electric power plants by thirty-two per cent over 2005 levels by 2030. 59 The President also promulgated his comprehensive Climate Action Plan, already reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by nine per cent compared to 2005 levels. 61 [page 165]
The Clean Power Plan has been challenged in a proceeding for judicial review, and the Supreme Court has issued a stay of the rule in the judicial proceedings. 62 Nonetheless, the EPA's previous greenhouse gas regulations have fared well in the Supreme Court, which has so far tended to look favourably on its statutory authority to regulate power plants, in particular. In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 63 the Court concluded that the Clean Air Act generally, and section 111 in particular, 64 which is the statutory authority for the Clean Power Plan, displaces the federal common law of nuisance.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court opined that 'the [Clean Air] Act "speaks directly" to emissions of carbon dioxide from defendants' [power] plants'. 65 Subsequently, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 66 the Court reaffirmed that 'The authorization to which we referred was that given in [section 111 of the Clean Air Act], a part of the Act not at issue here and one that no party in American Electric Power argued was ill suited to accommodating greenhouse gases'. 67 Consequently, even if portions of the specific regulatory structure of the Clean Power Plan are set aside, there is still every reason to believe that the EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases from power plants. 68 The legal authority for each of these actions, as well as additional legislative authorization, is enumerated in the US INDC. The Executive Branch has not released its analysis underlying the quantitative economy-wide reductions identified in the INDC, and there is some disagreement about whether they can be met. The World Resources Institute nonetheless has found that existing domestic authority is already sufficient to reach the 26-28 per cent target. 69 That goal is attainable through an amalgam of federal programs already in place (such as vehicle fuel-efficiency standards and the power-plant rules), proposals awaiting finalization (such as controls on methane [page 166] emissions from oil and gas operations), state-level actions either underway or actively contemplated, and existing federal legal authority that has yet to be tapped.
The Paris Agreement as an Executive Agreement
This complicated web of legal considerations and political factors readily explains both the last-minute fiasco precipitated by the United States over article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement and the perhaps more significant motivation to refrain from offering an INDC with binding, economy-wide emission-reduction targets.
Article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement
While there appears to be no publicly available document setting out behind the US delegation's serious concerns over the precise wording of article 4 (4) of the Paris Agreement, even a cursory glance at the text of that provision with a knowledgeable eye explains the underlying dynamics at play. As proposed by the President of the Paris COP in his final draft, the text read as follows: 'Developed country Parties shall continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets.' After resolution of the disputed language, the mandatory 'shall' was replaced by the hortatory 'should.'
The text directly addresses the hot-button issue of quantified economy-wide emission reductions of the Kyoto variety that had proven so politically controversial in the United States. From a legal point of view, such commitments can be difficult to implement using existing domestic legal authority. The US INDC in effect aggregates sectorspecific interventions expressly authorized by federal legislation in such areas as vehicle fuel efficiency and power plant emissions. There is no obvious legal authority for implementing a particular quantified Kyoto-style reduction target across all sectors, some of which may fall within the reserved powers of subnational units, such as the several states.
Lacking specific federal legislation creating such authority, the Executive Branch in its INDC had undertaken something of a 'work around', relying instead on the authority of sector-focused existing legislation. Further reductions beyond the targets stated in the US INDC available through the exercise of that authority could be limited, especially to the extent that the United States' numerical contribution to the Paris Outcome represents something approaching the maximum effort available through the deployment of existing [page 167] authority. 70 A binding, forward-looking promise that the United States will 'continue' to take the lead, in this interpretation, might lack present domestic legal authority.
There is some-and perhaps considerable-room to argue whether this is an excessively cautious legal interpretation of the first sentence of article 4(4) of the Paris Agreement. At least as interpreted by the United States, 'economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets' are not necessarily internationally legally binding. Moreover, 'undertake' in English, the language in which the precise phrasing was 70 The extent to which the US contribution is achievable is, not surprisingly, subject to some debate. Compare Hausker, et al., supra note 68, with C2ES, 'Achieving the United States Intended Nationally Determined Contribution' (Arlington, Virginia: June 2015) (identifying 'remaining gap that needs to be filled' beyond existing authority), <http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/achieving-us-indc.pdf>. contested, has an ambiguous meaning in this context 71 and does not necessarily indicate an intention to be bound. In any event, there is no prohibition on the United States' agreeing in an executive agreement to enter into a subsequent binding commitment. 
An Executive Agreement with Binding Emission-Reduction Obligations
The more interesting question, susceptible of analogous analytical treatment, is the extent to which the US INDC submitted in advance of the Paris negotiations could have been concluded as an internationally legally binding commitment instead of as a nonbinding, aspirational statement of political purpose.
The Paris Agreement, as discussed above, relies for its domestic implementation in the United States on existing legal authority. These include the 'procedural' requirements for data collection and exchange, periodic reporting, technology transfer, and scientific cooperation already included in the Convention, which received Senate advice and consent to ratification in 1992. 73 The President arguably has the capacity independently to perform all [page 168] these functions both as Chief Executive and in carrying out the foreign affairs function. 74 Indeed, Secretary Kerry impliedly relied on exactly this theory in stating on the day of the Paris Agreement's conclusion that 'this [agreement] doesn't need to be approved by the Congress because it doesn't have mandatory targets for reduction, and it doesn't have an enforcement-compliance mechanism'. 75 This statement clearly implies that an international agreement-presumably an executive agreement-containing mandatory targets would require Senate submission, a question which is eminently susceptible of legal analysis. As described above, the Paris Agreement was consciously structured to avoid the fraught term 'protocol', with all its domestic legal and political baggage in the United States. Hence, there is no a priori necessity to think that the instrument would need to be submitted to the US Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
The architecture of the Paris Agreement was also expressly constructed by all participating states to assure full participation by developing countries, thus satisfying the requirements of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which is not binding in domestic law in any event. Most importantly, the economy-wide emission-reduction targets identified in the US INDC rest on an independent statutory foundation that does not require Congressional approval in the form of Senate advice and consent to ratification or otherwise.
These questions are not mere semantic hair-splitting, but have practical, real-world consequences. The United States under the Obama Administration has engaged in many multilateral efforts from a domestic legal point of view as non-binding statements of purpose. 76 These include not just the economy-wide emission-reduction targets in the UN-sponsored climate negotiations, but also the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on nuclear issues with Iran. 77 The reason usually given is to protect a presumably intricate, delicately balanced multilateral deal from unilateral meddling by what is assumed to be a recalcitrant Senate. 78 [page 169]
This strategy comes with a potentially high price: the explicit option of summary abandonment or relaxation of the United States' economy-wide target after the end of the Obama Presidency. The US INDC purports to state the intention of the United States to reduce its emissions through 2025. As a matter of both domestic and international law, however, that is only a non-binding statement of political purpose by an Administration that will leave office in January 2017. A new President, perhaps of a different political party, need only say 'I changed my mind' to negate the internationally non-binding assurances made to the other parties to the Paris negotiations, nearly 200 in number --and in a manner entirely consistent with international law.
Part of the calculation may well have been that, by refraining from exacerbating relations with a recalcitrant Congress, the President would be better positioned to obtain authorization for the funding goals of the Paris Agreement in return. 79 If so, that strategy seems to have backfired, as proposed resolutions introduced in the Congress expressly tie funding to submission of the Paris Agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. 80 commitment. The United States and other countries adopting similar positions consequently prevailed on this issue of legal form, but as applied to the US one cannot help but question at what cost in terms of the longevity of that pledge. President Obama has repeatedly stated that he intends to use his executive authority to its maximum extent, presumably so as to cement his legacy as a leader on climate change as in other fields. But in practice the precise contours of actions taken by his Administration on his behalf may well have been tempered by an excess of caution, unnecessarily accepting the allure of an apparently cost-free Senate-proof strategy at the price of long-term durability.
